Capt Crenshaw's Rememberance of Col Studt
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REMEMBRANCE OF COLONEL JOHN STUDT (Ret) BY CARLTON CRENSHAW
I was a junior officer under Lt Col Studt for a 3 month period beginning on April 10 , 1968. Prior to that time I was the Executive Officer and Officer in Charge of a half battery of 105mm howitzers on Hill 881 South in the Khe Sanh Valley. Two days before the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marine Regiment (3/26) was to attack the North Vietnamese on the adjacent hill, Hill 881 North, Major Matthew Caulfield, 3/26's Operations Officer, and Lt Col Studt approached me and asked if I would be Lt Col Studt's personal forward artillery officer for the planned attack. They said that they had cleared this with my artillery battalion commander, Lt Col Henley, down at the Khe Sanh Combat Base. I readily accepted this offer and wanted to participate in the planned attack. The forward artillery coordinator (FSC) for 3/26 planned 30 different targets from our hill to Hill 881 North. They were to be fired in sequence as we moved down our hill in the attack starting at 0300 in the morning of 12 April. Because we wouldn't have any light until daybreak around 0600, I memorized those fire missions. As we descended our hill, I called the first 5 targets. We had to wait perhaps 15 minutes while the FSC cleared those targets. That was not acceptable in the circumstances. On the spot I was promoted to be the artillery FSC for 3/26. The attack went well and 3/26 overran the NVA positions on Hill 881 North. There were over 300 NVA killed in that attack.
Three Twenty-Six returned to Hill 881 South that evening and was flown out of Khe Sanh a few days later while I was evacuated to Da Nang with a severe rat bite that I encountered on Hill 881 South the night after our attack. After receiving 14 shots of rabies medicine, I returned to 3/26 two weeks later. That morning Major Joseph Loughran, 3/26's XO, had stepped on a land mine and was killed and Lt Colonel Studt was severely wounded by the mine blast. Colonel Studt refused to be evacuated and stayed with the battalion during a grueling 2 plus months of movement west from Da Nang overrunning many NVA base camps in the process.
Lt Col Studt was a very impressive Marine leader. He was very bright and aggressive and expected excellence among his officers and non-commissioned officers. He was an officer who led by both example and was always close to the lead position in the battalion. During this timeframe Lt Col Studt was suffering from his wounds and was treated daily by our battalion physician. We kept a grueling pace going up and down tall hills and mountains while engaged with the NVA. I was always close to him and could see that he was suffering. Yet he never let that interfere with our operation. There was one situation that I will never forget. One day, a very hot day, we were under pressure from the heat. One of our Marines fell out and sat down. Lt colonel Studt walked over to him and told the Marine to “get his butt off the ground” and walk behind him. John carried the Marine's pack in addition to his own. I volunteered to carry it but he wouldn't listen to me. Word of this incident spread through the battalion and we never had anyone fall out again.
Colonel Studt told me that he wanted to use artillery a lot and to not commit infantry to an attack before we had neutralized the enemy with artillery fire. I wholeheartedly agreed with that same philosophy. The FO's from the four companies and I blew everything away whenever possible. After about 6 weeks we had an incident where fixed wing aircraft missed their target and killed an entire Marine squad with 500 - pound bombs. We had to have them picked up in a cargo sling through the thick canopy. Colonel Studt told our forward air controller that he would never use bombs again close to his infantry. He leaned on me even more. Fourty - years later Colonel Studt informed me that my artillery regimental commander from the 11th Marine regiment wanted me relieved for “excessive use of artillery” – ten times as much as other Marine battalions were using. Colonel Studt and his superior, Colonel Bruce Myers, Regimental commander from the 26th Marine Regiment, appealed this to the commanding General (CG) of the First Marine Division and told him that our battalion had the highest kill ratio of every Marine battalion in Vietnam. The CG responded to his artillery commander to double the amount of artillery rounds used. I never learned of this until about 10 years ago.
We were engaged by NVA almost constantly during our search and destroy mission and never once were we caught off-guard by the NVA. We were always on the offensive and running over NVA units nearly every day.
Colonel Studt also took care of his men. Somehow he got us hot food delivered in makeshift field kitchens 2 times and had us resupplied with new uniforms as the ones we were wearing were disintegrating after a month of fighting in exposed weather every day. He ensured that every enlisted Marine ate their meal before the officers were allowed to eat. The same thing applied to uniforms. He also had his doctor bring small cordial bottles of “medicinal” brandy with him every day and I believe brought 10-12 every day. I got one nearly every night and truly enjoyed this one small creature comfort.
I stayed in contact with Colonel Studt over the past 53 years since we were together in Vietnam. When it was discovered that our recommendations for a Navy Cross award for Captain Dabney were lost and never submitted, Colonel Studt got into action and got both Matt Caulfield and me to resubmit recommendations as well to organize a Steering Committee to bird-dog the recs through the labyrinth approval process as well as to coordinate a ceremony for the award at VMI, close to the Dabney residence. I met Colonel Studt at the award ceremony and his son John. That was a fantastic experience. Colonel Studt and I stayed in contact over the 10-12 years after the award ceremony through emails, phone calls and Christmas cards. I will truly miss him.
Sincerely,
Carlton B. Crenshaw
Former Captain USMCR