The following is a transcript of a cassette tape made by Lieutenant Jack Rittichier, USCG, a Coast Guard helicopter pilot assigned to duty in Vietnam.  LT Rittichier had volunteered for an exchange program with the Air Force and he was assigned to the Air Force's 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron [ARRS], based at Da Nang, in the Republic of Vietnam.  Once with the 37th ARRS, Rittichier began flying the large Sikorsky HH-3E "Jolly Green Giant" rescue helicopters on incredibly dangerous combat search and rescue missions as both a copilot and soon thereafter as an aircraft commander and "Rescue Crew Commander."   In the tape he describes, in great detail, a number of rescue missions he undertook in April and May of 1968.  The Hai Van Pass incident is reproduced here.

LT Rittichier and his three-man crew of HH-3E "Jolly Green 23" were killed in action the following month, soon after he made the recording.

LT Jack Rittichier:  "I was on Alert Duty at Da Nang. I was the Aircraft Commander, which is also known as the Rescue Crew Commander (RCC).  I had as my co-pilot, Air Force Captain Robert Hicks, Jr.  There was another helicopter on strip alert duty with us and that aircraft was flown by Major Arthur Anderson and his co-pilot was Captain Bill Hagen.

I was the low bird, which put me in command, or I was the individual to make decisions for the two airplanes in the event of alert.  We had been scrambled just before noon this day toward Chu Lai where an aircraft had supposed to have crashed.  We returned when it was understood that both of the individuals in that crashed airplane were killed.  Just before six o'clock in the evening we received word to scramble from Da Nang.  Both helicopters were airborne at the same time and we were first told to go to a position 12 miles on the Three One Zero radial from Da Nang.  Since it was so very close; only 12 miles, we had very little opportunity to check about artillery in the area where we were going.  My job as low bird, and therefore lead, was to take our aircraft in first if a rescue was required.  We searched the area; the supposed area, and found that the location given us was erroneous.  Low bird, as the name might entail, meant that I stayed down low and looked while the other bird stayed up high and provided cover for me.  While we were down searching both aircraft noticed artillery ground bursts.  The high bird called a local controlling agency and asked about artillery in the area.  The answer came back from the controlling agency that there was no known friendly artillery in the area.  Our conclusion was that it was unfriendly artillery.  Soon after the position changed from the Three One Zero radial of 12 miles to the Three Two Zero and subsequently again to the Three Two Three radial and 12 miles.  We went to this position and found helicopters from other services hovering and in communications with the people on the ground.  The situation at the rescue site was that many members of a ground party had been taken aboard a helicopter; a CH-46.  The CH-46 attempted to get out of the landing zone and that the CH-46 helicopter crashed on takeoff.  The other helicopters in the area did not seem to have rescue capability so it devolved upon us, our flight of Jolly Green Giant helicopters, to initiate action to get the rescue going.  As lead I requested all other aircraft to get off the frequency and allow me to communicate directly with the people on the ground, which I did, and communications were, for once, very good.  I contacted on the ground a man who did a very fine job under the circumstances.  I never got to meet him later on but his call sign was "Quiz Master".  He handled his radios in a professional, unhurried, uncluttered and fine manner.  I asked him about the status of the people on the ground and he informed me that there were 16 dead.  There were 25 wounded and six or nine people from the helicopter crew who were in various conditions of injury and good health.  All of these people were located at the crash site, which we will try to call the Landing Zone: "LZ," from now on.

As we arrived on-scene so did bad weather; very thick clouds.  The clouds completely covered and obscured the Landing Zone.  The high and low birds continued to orbit the area and while doing this we talked to "Quiz Master" and received the following information: "The enemy strength was unknown.  The last time the ground party had been fired on was nine o'clock that morning.  The ground party had had no contact with any enemy or had heard no enemy since that time".  As the helicopters continued to orbit we made many passes over the general vicinity of the LZ and "Quiz Master" kept informing us just about when we were over.  By so doing we were able to just about pinpoint his location even though he could not see us and we could not see him because of the intervening clouds.  We also informed him that if he noticed any enemy come into the area because of the attraction of the helicopter and the noise we were making, that we would go out to another area and orbit and make low passes to pull the enemy in that direction rather than attract the enemy to the "Quiz Master's" position.  He said he would appreciate it.  After almost an hour of orbiting the weather cleared as we hoped it would and I was able to commence an approach.  All during this flight my co-pilot, Captain Hicks, was an invaluable aide. The two enlisted men in the back; Sergeant Enricas; the Flight Engineer and Sergeant Baker; the PJ, also did outstanding work.

I had the area pretty well pinpointed and started out a way, dropped my auxiliary external fuel tanks, then dumped down roughly to what might be considered a minimum fuel load so as to get my gross weight down to where I could make an out of ground affect hover, which seemed the only answer.

Back inbound toward the site I made a low, slow, dragged out approach to closely simulate what it would be like coming in and hovering right at the last.  We spotted the LZ and waved it off and things seemed to be in good shape.  We dumped a couple more hundred pounds to get down to where we knew the mission could go in and hover, then made a quick pattern and came back in.

The approach to the LZ was up a draw, or ravine, heavily wooded; heavy jungle all around.  The ravine slanted up into a box canyon, which faced onto a sheer mountain.  The approach was uphill.  The LZ was on the side of a huge mountain, an extremely steep slope. The LZ itself is somewhat of a misnomer because it was really a bombed out crater sort of thing. Bombs had been dropped there.   The bombs blasted down the jungle and the people then had a landing zone so to speak.  I asked "Quiz Master" if I could get my helicopter down in between the trees and he said, "H-46s had been doing it."  I told him the dimensions of my helicopter and he thought it was possible.  The trees surrounding the LZ were 150 to 200 feet tall and he told me my approach would have to be absolutely vertical down in, then my take off would have to be absolutely vertical straight up with all the people aboard.

My approach was made just at dusk.  I had no trouble at all locating and identifying the LZ although it was very difficult to see any people down there.  Since it was the only cleared spot of jungle within miles, that had to be place. I established a hover over the LZ and commenced to let down vertically and the helicopter performed beautifully.  My crew did outstanding work in keeping the helicopter clear of trees and informing me how close we were in all directions so that I could move downward as far as the helicopter would go.  When we reached the very bottom level where we had to stop; where we could get no lower, we still were very far from the ground but I determined that if I could move the helicopter forward; still forward on the LZ, that the severe slope would bring the helicopter closer to the ground, although I would be descending no more.  So the helicopter moved forward with very little clearance on the rotor blades, either side, and I was able to accomplish a hover of approximately 20 feet above the ground.  This is much better than a one or two hundred foot hover that I had anticipated. Moving forward in this position the trees completely overhung above the helicopter on all sides except the tail and that was the direction of course we came into the site.  We lowered the tree penetrator but the people on the ground seemed unfamiliar with it.  We brought the tree penetrator back up, put the PJ on the penetrator, lowered the PJ and the penetrator back down to the ground, then the PJ was able to explain to the people the operation of the tree penetrator.  All through this time there was close coordination between all the crewmembers and the helicopter.  The PJ put two people on the penetrator at a time. We hoisted four, put the penetrator back down and then hoisted up the PJ.  We really didn't know what we could expect from enemy forces on this particular approach and pickup. We received no known ground fire.  Once the people were placed inside the helicopter we backed away from the steep slope, the slope slanting away from us as we came out from underneath the trees.  The crew kept me constantly advised of "Go left" or "Go right, Up", or "Down", so as to keep clear of the trees.  I don't think any part of the helicopter ever touched any trees on any of our approaches that day.

We backed out to a point where we could climb up.  While backing we climbed 200 feet.  The best way out seemed to be, after leveling from the climb, make a rudder turn almost over the spot to keep clear of the trees and then picking up as much speed with the power available, fly back down the ravine, which was downhill and slightly downwind, but that was the best we had available to us and we were able to gain airspeed and flying room in this manner.  We got up speed rapidly and climbed out over the nearby hills.  It was dark at that time and we headed back toward the Da Nang area as our FE in back and our PJ worked with the people we had just rescued.

We decided to take these people to NSA; a naval hospital, rather than land at Da Nang because we knew the naval hospital had medical facilities and we were unable to determine how quickly we could get the people in the hospital where they belonged if we took them to Da Nang.  We were on minimum fuel, dropped the survivors at NSA and flew immediately back to Da Nang just a few miles away and enroute we decided that since many of the people back at the rescue site were not ambulatory, they were litter cases; stretcher cases, that we would pick up as many litters back at Da Nang as we could possibly get.

I briefed the FE to try to get a hot refueling, which meant engines and rotors turning back at Da Nang while they put fuel in the aircraft, which is not the best procedure but it would expedite matters.  I briefed the PJ to jump out of the airplane as soon as we got there and pick up every Stokes Litter that he could find and bring it back in the airplane. I  briefed the co-pilot that if it was necessary to coordinate anything I was going to have him get out of the airplane and talk with people on the ground rather than pull the people inside the airplane or try and do it by radio.  This was all done before we landed at Da Nang.

Landing at Da Nang much of our work had already been done for us by the good coordinators back here at Da Nang.  For instance, Colonel Carlyle met us at the airplane while the engines and rotors were still running. He came into the aircraft and told me that they would give us a hot refueling.  This meant that my FE did not have to depart too far from the airplane.  My co-pilot could stay in the airplane and all I needed to do was send my PJ out and pick up the litters.  While we were there it was suggested - and it was a good suggestion - that we take another PJ with us, which we did.  This was Sergeant Northern.  We did not seem to be on the ground more than five minutes and I was very happy with the coordination and cooperation I received back here at Da Nang to permit us to get out immediately.

We departed Da Nang and took the shortest possible route back to the distress site.  Enroute we could see flares being dropped at the rescue site.  To back up a few moments in time let me set the scene for you.  As I departed the rescue scene with my first four survivors - when I left Jolly Green 21 - Major Anderson was supposed to have been the next airplane coming in because he was the high bird and ours was the flight scrambled.  However, just about this time two other Jolly Green helicopters arrived on-scene.  We had requested other helicopters prior to my departure.  These two helicopters were Jolly Green 25 and Jolly Green 10.  Jolly Green 25 claimed he had minimum fuel and requested to get in right away to make his pickup.  Jolly Green 21 relinquished his position allowing 25 to go in next.  Jolly Green 25 and 21 had come down from a forward operating location up north of Da Nang and were on their way home when they got the message to come over and help us at this distress site.  The reason they were at low fuel was because they had landed at Da Nang enroute to our position and had dropped off their auxiliary fuel tanks.  Therefore Jolly Green 25 moved in for the next pickup.  The pilot was Major Billy Winfield.  He stated he also noted field artillery ground bursts near our positions.  All of our Jolly Green helicopters engaged in the rescue that night stated that they saw artillery ground bursts although the controlling agencies stated that there was no known friendly artillery firing into our area.  Jolly Green 25 turned on his landing lights and flood lights, made an approach to the LZ.  He hovered over the trees.  He did not go down in among and under the trees as I had done.  He picked up four people from a high hover. He stated then that he backed out of the position, executed a turn and headed back for the Da Nang area.

Next, Jolly Green 21; my high bird, moved in for the pickup.  Jolly Green 21 also dropped his auxiliary fuel tanks out in the jungle, reduced his fuel load so as to allow himself to hover on a ground affect.  He moved in over the LZ and established a 150 to perhaps 200-foot hover and hoisted from above the trees.  He hoisted six people.  I repeat; he hoisted six people up into his aircraft.  He backed out of the area and flew back toward Da Nang.  At this point I do not remember if Jolly Green 25 and 21 took their survivors to the NSA hospital or back to Da Nang . It is probably irrelevant at this point. I'd like to remind that all of this was being done now in the dark under flares being dropped from an airplane at 9,000 feet.  The mountainous area where we were had the top of the mountains at 4,000 feet and our rescue site; the disaster site, the crash site, was at about 2,500 feet; half way up this mountain.

Next, Jolly Green 10 moved in for his approach and you recall he had already taken his auxiliary tanks off at Da Nang before proceeding to the crash site.  Jolly Green 10 experienced a little difficultly finding the LZ because he had not been there previously.  He had not obtained a good fix on it [visually].  Flares and a strobe light were used to guide him in.  He came in, and as he was I noticed a very large cloud of white smoke coming out of the jungle on his right.   He said . . . the pilot also said he noticed it and thought it was a flare burning in the jungle.  I thought it was an artillery piece Smoke Marker used as a range finder. Regardless, at this point it has not been resolved as of yet.  Jolly Green 10 was piloted by Major Verndander.  His co-pilot was Captain Dick Ying.

They moved in over the LZ, established a high hover over the trees as the other aircraft had done and picked up four survivors.  At this time "Quiz Master", on the ground, informed all those on his frequency that no more survivors could be picked up by tree penetrator until the litter cases were picked up.  By this time I was back on-scene.  I heard this conversation and I had the litters aboard, so the next obvious thing to do was for me to make my second approach. We dumped our fuel down so it would reduce our gross weight to allow us to safely operate in the area, and as these last few incidents between Jolly Green 10, "Quiz Master" and Jolly Green 28 were occurring, weather again formed over the Landing Zone.  This was partly attributed to the smoke from the flares.  Many flares had been dropped.  Much smoke had come into the area and probably this smoke constituted condensation nuclei, which aided in the forming of clouds and or fog over the LZ.  Very soon the area was completely overcast again as it had been when myself and my crew in Jolly Green 28 and Jolly Green 21 had first arrived late in the afternoon.  I felt that if the clouds had gone away late in the afternoon permitting us to make this many rescues that perhaps it would go away again if we just waited around long enough, and we had the fuel to do this and we had the airplanes to do this.  The flares were still coming down.  I informed "Quiz Master" of the situation and decided that I would make an attempt to get in underneath the clouds.  Previously I had also done this and in each case my first attempt to get in underneath the clouds by going down a valley did not prove fruitful.  We found that we just couldn't get in under the clouds that way. On this next approach when I had the litters I decided to try a new tech.  As had been previously stated, the LZ was about half way up this steep mountain.  The mountain slope was variously estimated between 30 and 60 degrees.  The top of the mountain appeared to be almost vertically coming down.  Then, about a third of the way down, starting to slope itself and farther on down the slope, then was the LZ.  I informed "Quiz Master" that I was going to try an approach and asked him to listen for me.  I came around the mountain under the flares. Incidentally, while all aircraft were flying under the flares, after the flares would burn out, the parachutes would still be descending and there was nothing on these parachutes to illuminate them, so all aircraft were continually flying around and taking quick evasive maneuvers to avoid flying into these parachutes that were unlighted.  The lighted flares presented less of a problem because of their brilliance and were easy to vector around.

The "Quiz Master" listened for my approach.  I flew the helicopter as though I was going to fly into the mountain.  I let the helicopter down near the face of the mountain.  I informed my crew to use a rescue light on the right side of the helicopter to shine out under the rotor blades on the right side, directing my co-pilot to shine the searchlight from the nose over to the left side to check on the blades on the left side.  I turned on my forward and downward looking landing light for forward illumination.  I turned on my floodlights for downward illumination.  Almost in a hover but still in translational life, I let the aircraft down toward the face of the mountain.  The clouds came right up to the face of the mountain and my objective was to try to let the aircraft down slowly between the face of the mountain and between the clouds, or into the clouds.  We slowly approached the face of the mountain and then turned the helicopter so as the face of the mountain was on our right shoulder and we let down right over the top of the trees.  The slope then fell away to our left.  With all the lights on we could see the trees very well and therefore we had good clearance.  I informed the co-pilot to start sweeping the nose spotlight back and forth.  This then would help keep us oriented.  He did this and he did a fine job of it and we were able to keep oriented all the way down.  We simply hovered down the face of the mountain in translational lift.  Our path then was obliquely across the face of the mountain with the final bottom portion of it designed to bring us near the LZ.  At all times we could look out and see the trees on our right and then the slope falling off steeply to the left into the clouds.  Actually the slope fell away under us into the clouds. We could see nothing on the left but we knew that the slope was down there falling away.  Nearly down at the bottom of the approach "Quiz Master" told me that he heard me, that my position was dust, and so from him I was able to turn the aircraft then toward him, still descending slowly; still creeping in toward the LZ, and we had long since then been down under the clouds but the lights aided us in seeing the trees and by seeing the trees we could clear all the obstacles. We simply hovered over the tops of the jungle trees down underneath the clouds.  This seemed to be the best answer to me.  "Quiz Master" kept telling us to fly a little bit more in one direction then a little bit more in the next, and it wasn't a minute or two later before we were right over the LZ.  We were hovering and we were high. We made a rudder turn almost on the spot from the high hover and then the crew and I worked the helicopter straight down again vertically 200 feet, down over the LZ, and then forward under the trees again.  Still hovering we were able to get the helicopter down slightly lower than last time because we were somewhat familiar with the area by this time.

We lowered Sergeant Baker, then the litters, down to the ground.  He did a fine job getting the patients ready and the litters, and we expedited getting the litter patients up and all of them were hoisted with no problems.  The crew did a fine job.  Then we brought Sgt Baker back up and we had been in a hover approximately 15 or 20 minutes and brought up five litter patients. Again, the crew, with all the lights on, helped me back the helicopter out from under the trees and then rise up straight vertically, then again we executed at a least a 90 degree turn. We were unable to go forward because that was the face of the mountain.  We were not too sure of going backwards because the trees were up in the clouds and we couldn't see many trees then in the clouds.  We approached the clouds, immediately went IFR; executed an IFR climb, and the co-pilot kept me on heading by issuing me reminders not to go too far to the left because that was the mountain.  We only hoped that we would not climb out and strike one of the parachute flares coming down.  We broke out on top.  Everything seemed in fine shape and we headed back for Da Nang.

We decided not to go to NSA with our litter patients because our fuel was just too low and Da Nang was the best answer for fuel.  We would be forced to transport the litter patients by some other means to the best hospital.  While enroute "Queen" told us to land at Da Nang with our patients and put the litters aboard Jolly Green 10 who had landed already at Da Nang and by so doing this was another fine bit of coordination.  It helped the mission immeasurably.

Then Jolly Green 21 made his approach. I can only presume that this was also a hazardous approach because as I left it was IFR.  Major Anderson and crew, again, hoisted six people from a high hover above the trees and his report shows that while he was doing this parts of the clouds were coming down through his rotors and it made visibility very difficult in the hover and it made it very difficult to maintain a hover and see hover references off the trees.  It was an extremely commendable approach; an extremely commendable hover, hoist and rescue. He came out of there IFR also and by this time Jolly Green 25; Major Winfield, was back in the area.  Major Anderson in Jolly Green 21, when climbing out, advised "Queen" that the LZ and the rescue zone was IFR and Jolly Green 21 recommended no more approaches.  I was just getting ready to take off and I appraised "Queen" that I could find a way back in and I was requesting to make another approach, especially since Jolly Green 21 had informed "Queen" that there were still six people left.  I didn't want to leave these people.  "Queen" told me that my request would be disapproved.  Jolly Green 21 started back.  "Queen" was anticipating bringing all the forces back and I took off for the rescue zone.  I felt that if there's any way of talking anybody into this I wanted to do it enroute and be making tracks toward the rescue zone.  Jolly Green 25 was on his way back.  Jolly Green 21 was on his way back and we still had six people in there and I wanted to make an attempt.  Our Control called me.  The squadron CO called me on HF and asked me what I thought.  I told him what I thought.  I based my opinion on the fact that the weather had cleared in the afternoon and that we could keep airplanes up there and hope for a break, and still go in and make a rescue.  "Queen" disapproved this.  The squadron CO stated that with the temperature and dew point being what it was late in the evening, that he felt that there would be no breaks.  Reluctantly I had to concur with his thinking. I was then ordered to return to Da Nang, which I did, but I still felt bad about leaving six people up in the LZ.

All of the Jolly Green helicopters did a fine job and were subsequently told that the next morning at first light the Marines were going to attempt to bring out the remaining six.  It was my opinion that the Jolly Greens should go in and pick them up because the Jolly Greens were more conversant with the area.

As of this date I do not know the final outcome of the case.  I can only commend all the Jolly Greens for doing an outstanding job.  I commend my co-pilot.  I commend my crew.  I commend Jolly Green 21 and its crew.  These people did an outstanding and professional job.  Through their efforts on that night of 12 May the Jolly Greens were able to bring out 29 survivors.  All but four were brought out in the dead of night, under flares, from an extremely hazardous flying area.
 
 

By Direction of the President, LIEUTENANT JACK C RITTICHIER, 8148 (USCG) is posthumously awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross (Second Oak Leaf Cluster) for heroism while participating in aerial flight on 12 May 1968.

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS
(SECOND OAK LEAF CLUSTER)
(POSTHUMOUS)
TO
JACK C. RITTICHIER
(UNITED STATES COAST GUARD)

Lieutenant JACK C RITTICHIER distinguished himself by heroism while participating in aerial flight as an HH-3E Rescue Crew Commander near Da Nang, Republic of Vietnam, on 12 May 1968.  On that date, Lieutenant RITTICHIER twice entered an extremely hostile area to effect the rescue of four survivors of a downed helicopter and five seriously wounded personnel.  The survivors were located on an extremely small landing zone, surrounded by tall trees, on the side of a steep mountain slope.  With great determination and superior airmanship, Lieutenant RITTICHIER executed the second approach and departure at night by flarelight even though the distress site even though the distress site was obscured by smoke and clouds.  The professional competence, aerial skill, and devotion to duty displayed by Lieutenant RITTICHIER reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.